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Cockle: Importing Health Benefits Into Wages-An
Invitation for Legislative Review of the Wage
Definition Under Washington's Industrial
Insurance Act
Matthew H. Adams*
It might very well be that it would be wiser to provide by legisla-
tion for the result contended for by respondent workman. We
may not, however, under the guise of construction substitute our
view for that of the legislature. We are not a super legislature.'
INTRODUCTION
Every day workers suffer work-related injuries or illnesses. Since
the early twentieth century, society has compensated injured workers
through the workers' compensation system. 2 As part of their compen-
* J.D., 2001, Seattle University School of Law; B.A. 1995, University of Washington. I am
grateful to Professor Philip Talmadge of Seattle University School of Law for his valuable review
and criticism of this Note. In addition, I appreciate the collective efforts of the Seattle University
Law Review members who assisted in preparing this Note for publication. Thanks to Nancy
Thygesen Day of Vandeberg Johnson & Gandara for helping me to better understand industrial
insurance law. I would also like to thank stakeholder representatives for their candor and insight:
Clifton Finch of Association of Washington Business; David Kaplan of Washington Self-
Insurers Association; and Robert Stem of Washington State Labor Council. Finally, special
thanks to my family and friends for their love, patience, and support.
1. Courtright v. Sahlberg Equip., Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 541, 545, 563 P.2d 1257, 1260 (1977).
2. The workers' compensation system was designed to address the growing number of
work-related injuries incurred during the industrial revolution. Prior to the creation of workers'
compensation in the early twentieth century, injured workers had to file lawsuits to receive com-
pensation following a work-related injury. If they could establish that the employer was in some
way negligent or at fault, injured workers received whatever benefits a jury would award them,
including compensation for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. See Price V.
Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers' Compensation in the United States,
1900-1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 307-08 (1998). "A variety of common-law defenses protected
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sation, workers receive wage-replacement benefits for disabilities,
medical expenses, and vocational rehabilitation.3 The amount of
benefits received by a worker is based upon the worker's wages at the
time of injury.'
Like most states, Washington has a complicated workers' com-
pensation statute, the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA),5 which sets forth
a formula for calculating wages. IIA defines "wages" as monetary
payment in addition to the value of "board, housing, fuel, or consid-
eration of like nature" to those items.6 The phrase "other considera-
tion of like nature" has been the subject of much litigation regarding
the intent of Washington's Legislature (Legislature). The Washing-
ton Supreme Court recently interpreted this phrase in Cockle v. De-
partment of Labor & Industries,7 holding for the first time that IIA's
definition of "wages" includes the reasonable value of employer-
provided health insurance.
Cockle represents a sea change in Washington's industrial insur-
ance law because fringe benefits have never been included in the defi-
nition of "wages" under Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
51.08.178. Including health insurance as wages conflicts with com-
mon wage definitions.8 Therefore, the Cockle decision creates the im-
petus for a bitter struggle over the calculation of workers' compensa-
tion under IIA.9  This struggle will have long-term effects on
stakeholders, particularly self-insured employers and state agencies
that administer and adjudicate injured workers' claims.
employers from liability, but once plaintiffs overcame these defenses, employers faced the possi-
bility of ruinous awards that were not covered by insurance." Debra T. Ballen, The Sleeper Issue
in Health Care Reform: The Threat to Workers' Compensation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1291, 1292
(1994).
3. IRENE SCHARF & WILLIAM D. HOCHBERG, WORKERS' COMPENSATION PRACTICE,
1A WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 59.6 (4th ed. 2001).
4. See generally 5 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW § 93.01(l)(a), at 93-4 to -6 (2001) [hereinafter LARSON) (describing the
most common wage-calculation statute). In 1991, Lex Larson officially assumed authorship of
the workers' compensation treatise that was originally written by his father, Arthur Larson. See
Larson's Worker's Compensation Pages, About Lex Larson, available at http://www.larsonpubs.
com/aboutlex.html.
5. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 51 (2000).
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.178(1) (2000) ("For the purposes of this title, the monthly
wages the worker was receiving from all employment at the time of injury shall be the basis upon
which compensation is computed unless otherwise provided specifically in the statute concerned
7. 142 Wash. 2d 801, 16 P.3d 583 (2001).
8. See LARSON, supra note 4, § 93.01(2)(b), at 93-21 (stating that most jurisdictions view
the concept of "wages" as excluding fringe benefits).
9. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 51 (2000).
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Wage Definition under IIA
By including employer-provided health insurance in IIA's defini-
tion of "wages," the Cockle majority stated that its decision continues
"serving the goal of swift and certain relief for injured workers."1
However, while attempting to advance an objective of Washington's
workers' compensation system, the majority improperly substituted its
view of wages for that of the Legislature. The majority's decision will
result in significant policy changes to industrial insurance law, changes
best left to the legislative process. The Legislature should narrow the
scope of this "judicial legislation in the guise of statutory construc-
tion" " because the decision offers little guidance to the stakeholders
and no principled limitation on the scope of benefits.
This Note addresses the efficacy of construing the term "wages"
in RCW 51.08.178 to include employer-provided health insurance,
hoping to serve as a resource for the Legislature to reevaluate IIA's
wage definition in light of Cockle. First, this Note gives a general
background of IIA and the Act's time-loss compensation scheme.
Next, this Note discusses how Washington and other jurisdictions
treat fringe benefits in defining "wages." This Note then examines
the Washington Supreme Court's ground-breaking decision in Cockle,
in which the court held that the value of employer-provided medical
and dental benefits are part of the basis used to calculate workers'
compensation payments. Finally, this Note analyzes the implications
of Cockle and argues that the Legislature should narrow the Cockle
court's interpretation of wages.
I. WASHINGTON'S INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE ACT
Enacted in 1911 ,1'2 IIA is the result of careful balancing between
business and labor interests. 3 Workers receive guaranteed limited
compensation for work-related injuries on a "no-fault" basis, while
employers provide statutorily prescribed benefits in order to be re-
10. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 822, 16 P.3d at 593 (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117
Wash. 2d 128, 138, 814 P.2d 629, 634 (1991)).
11. Appellant's Brief at 37, Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 96 Wash. App. 69, 977
P.2d 668 (1999) (No. 22486-1-I1).
12. Laws of 1911, ch. 74, at 345, REMINGTON REV. STAT. §§ 7673-7724, 10836(4) (cur-
rent version in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE tit. 51); see also Stertz v. Indus. Ins.
Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 590-91, 158 P. 256, 258 (1916) (explaining the genesis of Washington's
workers' compensation scheme).
13. See Brand v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. 2d 659, 668, 989 P.2d 1111, 1115
(1999) ("This 'grand compromise' operates as a quid pro quo in which employers and employees
exchange procedural and substantive rights for an ordered system of certain compensation with-
out regard to fault."); Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash. 2d 853, 859, 904 P.2d 278, 282 (1995)
(noting that Washington's IIA was the product of a grand compromise in 1911).
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leased from civil liability under the "exclusive remedy" doctrine.14
IIA is liberally construed to give effect to its remedial purpose of
minimizing work-related suffering and economic loss."
As part of its wage-replacement scheme, IIA grants "time-loss
benefits" to a worker who suffers temporary total disability due to an
industrial injury. 16 The amount of payment for time-loss benefits de-
pends upon the worker's marital status, number of dependents, and
monthly wages.17 Payments continue until a physician releases the
temporarily disabled worker for any kind of gainful employment, or
until the worker's claim is closed. 8 If the worker's earning capacity is
only partially restored after returning to gainful employment, the
worker becomes eligible for "loss of earning power benefits." 9 Time-
loss and loss of earning power benefits are intended to reflect a
worker's "lost earning capacity,"" and monthly payments are capped
at the applicable percentage of the state's average monthly wage.2'
Although funding sources are different, every employer has a
duty to secure time-loss benefits payment.22 Those not self-insured
14. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (2000) (providing "sure and certain relief" for in-
jured workers, regardless of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy); Darin Calbreath
Davidson, Expansion of the "Deliberate Intention" Exception to Washington's Workers' Compensa-
tion Exclusivity: Following Birklid v. Boeing Co., When Does an Employer Intend Employee In-
jury?, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 225, 231 (1997) (discussing mechanics of the "exclusive remedy" doc-
trine).
15. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.010 (2000) ("There is a hazard in all employment and
it is the purpose of this title to embrace all employments which are within the legislative jurisdic-
tion of the state. This title shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum
the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of em-
ployment."); Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash. 2d 793, 798, 947 P.2d 727, 729
(1997) (holding that IIA is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to compensate
injured workers, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker).
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090(1) (2000). "Temporary total disability" is a condition
that temporarily incapacitates a worker from undertaking gainful employment. Hubbard v.
Dep't of Labor & Indus., 140 Wash. 2d 35, 43, 992 P.2d 1002, 1006 (2000).
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090(1).
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090(3)(a), (4)(a); Hubbard, 140 Wash. 2d at 43,992 P.2d at
1006 ("A claimant's right to temporary total disability benefits (time loss payments) terminates
when the claimant's earning power, at any kind of work, is restored to that existing at the time of
the occurrence of the injury, or when the claimant's claim is closed. Temporary total disability
benefits also terminate when the claimant is able to earn a wage at any kind of reasonably con-
tinuous and generally available employment.").
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090(3); Hubbard, 140 Wash. 2d at 43, 992 P.2d at 1006.
20. Double D Hop Ranch, 133 Wash. 2d at 798, 947 P.2d 729; see also Kilpatrick v. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 125 Wash. 2d 222, 230, 883 P.2d 1370, 1375 (1994) (describing "earning capac-
ity" during disability period as "future" earning capacity).
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090(7) (2000) (referring to WASH. REV. CODE §
51.08.018).
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.14.010 (2000) ("Every employer under this title shall secure
the payment of compensation under this title by: (1) Insuring and keeping insured the payment
of such benefits with the state fund; or (2) Qualifying as a self-insurer under this title.").
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employers23 pay premiums into the State Industrial Insurance Fund 4
(State Fund) based upon the degree of hazard involved in their occu-
pation. 2' The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) then
makes the appropriate amount of payment to the injured worker. In
comparison, "self-insured" employers pay for benefits out of their
own assets and may reinsure up to 80% of their liability. 
26
II. APPROACHES TO DEFINING WAGES
The definition of "wages" is an important component of workers'
compensation statutes because the amount of benefits received by a
worker is based upon the worker's wages at the time of injury. There
is a variety of wage definitions. Most statutes define "wages" to re-
23. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.173 (2000) ("'Self-insurer' means an employer or group
of employers which has been authorized under this title to carry its own liability to its employees
covered by this title.").
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.175 (2000). The State Fund consists of the accident and
medical aid funds. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.44.010, .020 (2000); See also SCHARF &
HOCHBERG, supra note 3, § 59.6 (describing the accident and medical aid funds). "Washington
is one of only six states that use an exclusive state fund to provide workers' compensation insur-
ance to employers." JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM., WORKERS'
COMPENSATION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT 98-9, at 11 (Dec. 1998), available at
http://jlarc.leg. wa.gov/Reports/98-9WorkComp.PDF [hereinafter AUDIT REPORT]. "The
other jurisdictions with exclusive state funds are Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. Nevada [was] scheduled to allow private insurance beginning in 1999." Id. at 11
n.1. Because Washington "does not allow private carriers to participate in workers' compensa-
tion insurance .... [T]he costs are spread only between two groups: the State, and self-
insurers." Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wash. 2d 128, 136, 814 P.2d 629, 633 (1991) (citation
omitted).
25. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.16.035(1) (2000) ("The department shall classify all occu-
pations or industries in accordance with their degree of hazard and fix therefore basic rates of
premium which shall be the lowest necessary to maintain actuarial solvency of the accident and
medical aid funds in accordance with recognized insurance principles .....
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.14.020 (2000), which provides:
(1) An employer may qualify as a self-insurer by establishing to the director's satisfac-
tion that he or she has sufficient financial ability to make certain the prompt payment
of all compensation under this title and all assessments which may become due from
such employer. Each application for certification as a self-insurer submitted by an
employer shall be accompanied by payment of a fee of one hundred fifty dollars or
such larger sum as the director shall find necessary for the administrative costs of
evaluation of the applicant's qualifications. Any employer who has formerly been cer-
tified as a self-insurer and thereafter ceases to be so certified may not apply for certifi-
cation within three years of ceasing to have been so certified.
(5) A self-insurer may reinsure a portion of his or her liability under this title with any
reinsurer authorized to transact such reinsurance in this state: PROVIDED, That the
reinsurer may not participate in the administration of the responsibilities of the self-
insurer under this title. Such reinsurance may not exceed eighty percent of the liabili-
ties under this title.
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flect a worker's "actual earnings.- 27  However, there is a split of au-
thority regarding whether wages encompass fringe benefits such as
employer-provided health insurance.28
A. The Federal Approach: Morrison-Knudsen
The leading federal case is the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs.29 Morrison-Knudsen involves the
calculation of compensation for the family of James Hilyer, who was
struck and killed by a cement truck while helping to build the District
of Columbia Metrorail System. At issue was whether the decedent's
wage basis should include 68 cents consisting of per-hour value paid
into the union health and welfare fund, pension fund, and training
fund.3" The Court construed the following "wages" clause in the 1927
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA):
"Wages" means the money rate at which the service rendered is
recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of
the injury, including the reasonable value of board, rent, hous-
ing, lodging, or similar advantage received from the employer,
and gratuities received in the course of employment from others
than the employer.31
Based upon its interpretation of the "wages" clause, the Court
held that employer contributions to union trust funds for health and
welfare, pensions, and training were not wages for the purpose of cal-
culating compensation benefits under LHWCA.32
The Morrison-Knudsen Court stated that the value of the em-
ployer's contributions was too difficult to ascertain and was therefore
not of "similar advantage" to board, rent, housing, or lodging, which
27. Professor Larson suggests that a worker's "actual earnings" include wages and any
other item received as consideration for the work constituting real economic gain to the worker
such as tips, bonuses, commissions, and room and board. 5 LARSON, supra note 4, § 93.01(2)(a),
at 93-17 to -18.
28. See id. § 93.01D(2)(b), at D93-62 to -70 (surveying cases by jurisdiction). Fringe bene-
fits have been a part of modem industry in America since employers began offering a variety of
health insurance plans in addition to regular wages. KENNETH R. WING ET AL., THE LAW
AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 14-18 (1998). Therefore, when the Legislature enacted RCW
51.08.178 in 1971, health insurance was a significant employee benefit. See RASHI FEIN,
MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS 23 (1986) (stating that by 1951, 77 million people were cov-
ered by health insurance).
29. 461 U.S. 624 (1983).
30. Id. at 627-28.
31. Id. at 629 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 902(13) (1972) (incorporated into the District of Co-
lumbia Workmen's Compensation Act)).
32. Id. at 637. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion.
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have a present value readily converted into a cash equivalent.33 In de-
ciding that the contributions could not be so converted, the Court
found that the employer's cost of maintaining the trust funds was ir-
relevant because there was no direct relation between the size of the
contributions and the size of the decedent's benefits or pension cred-
its.34 The Court emphasized that Hilyer was too far removed from the
benefits because his interest in them was speculative.
35
The Morrison-Knudsen Court then consulted legislative history,
finding no evidence indicating that Congress intended wages to in-
clude employer contributions to benefits plans.36 The Court recog-
nized that fringe benefits were a common feature in America, but
found that Congress's exclusion of these benefits in the originally en-
acted and revised versions of LHWCA was illustrative of Congres-
sional intent to exclude such benefits from the Act's wage definition.37
In contrast, Congress added fringe benefits to the definition of
"wages" in other statutory schemes.
The Court further noted that LHWCA uses the concept of
"wages" in several ways.39  Therefore, to maintain consistency
throughout LHWCA, the expanded concept of "wages" would have
to be adopted in calculating the "national average weekly wage,"
which forms the basis for arriving at the overall maximum weekly
benefit figure.4" The Court, however, found that this calculation
would be extremely difficult.4'
Finally, the Morrison-Knudsen Court noted that the Department
of Labor consistently excluded fringe benefits from wages.42 Although
the agency's interpretation was not controlling, the agency was entitled
to deference since it was charged with the enforcement and interpreta-
tion of LHWCA.43 The Court emphasized that any reinterpretation
of LHWCA's wage definition would significantly alter the balance
achieved by Congress between employers and workers.44 The Court
explained that expanding the definition would undermine the goal of
33. Id. at 630.
34. Id. at 630-31.
35. Id. at 631.
36. Id. at 632-33.
37. Id. at 632.
38. Id. at 632-33 (citing Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a).
39. Id. at 633 (citing provisions related to calculating disability and survivors' benefits).
40. Id. at 634-35. The federal scheme is similar to Washington's "average monthly wage"
formula in RCW 51.08.018.
41. Morrison-Knudsen, 461 U.S. at 634.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 635.
44. Id. at 636.
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providing prompt compensation to injured workers because the wage-
calculation formula, which was almost never a source of controversy,
45would become a focus of dispute in almost every case.
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the term "wages," as
used in LHWCA, includes the employer's contributions to union
trust funds for health and welfare, pensions, and training.46 Justice
Marshall dismissed the majority's concern over the uncertainty about
the precise value of a given benefit, stating, "The trust funds obvi-
ously have some value for employees and simply to exclude them from
consideration is hardly an appropriate response to uncertainty about
their precise value. In addition, the statute itself calls only for inclu-
sion of 'the reasonable value' of non-cash items ... ." Justice Mar-
shall argued that LHWCA focused on a worker's loss of earning
power as a result of an industrial injury, which did not permit a dis-
tinction between direct cash payments and payments into a plan that
provides benefits to the worker.48 Consequently, wages should include
benefits because they represent a portion of the worker's earning
power.
B. Other Approaches
In addition to the United States Supreme Court, various state
appellate courts have considered whether wages should include fringe
benefits such as health insurance. Many states have recognized that
health insurance is a fringe benefit and have excluded such insurance
from an injured worker's wage basis for calculating workers' compen-
sation." Other states, however, have concluded that wages include
fringe benefits. These courts, like the Cockle majority, tend to follow
the reasoning of Justice Marshall's dissent in Morrison-Knudsen that it
45. Id. at 637.
46. Id. at 638 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 642 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 902(13) (1972)).
48. Id. at 640-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 641 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. See Theuer v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 624 N.W.2d 110 (Wis. 2001); Ander-
son v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 541 S.E.2d 526 (S.C. 2001); Groover v. Johnson Controls World Serv.,
527 S.E.2d 639 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Lazarus v. Indus. Comm'n of Arizona, 947 P.2d 875 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1997); Pascarelli v. Molitemo Stone Sales, Inc., 689 A.2d 1132 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997),
cert. denied, 692 A.2d 1282 (Conn. 1997); Pluto v. Illinois Indus. Comm'n, 650 N.E.2d 631 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995); Pollard v. Knox County, 886 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. 1994); Borofsky's Case, 582
N.E.2d 538 (Mass. 1991); Antillon v. New Mexico State Highway. Dep't, 820 P.2d 436 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1991); Tabor v. Levi Strauss & Co., 801 S.W.2d 311 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990); Linton v.
City of Great Falls, 749 P.2d 55 (Mont. 1988); Nelson v. SAIF Corp., 731 P.2d 429 (Or. 1987);
Gajan v. Bradlick Co., 355 S.E.2d 899 (Va. Ct. App. 1987); Rainey v. Mills, 733 S.W.2d 756
(Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 616 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
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is harsh to ignore fringe benefits because they are an important part of
a worker's earning power."1 Still other states have made the inclusion
of fringe benefits depend upon the statutory language itself5 2 or
whether they are "vested." 3
Some commentators have extensively analyzed the issue of fringe
benefits as part of wages. For example, Professor Arthur Larson, au-
thor of a leading treatise on workers' compensation law, observed:
Workers' compensation has been in force in the United States
for over seventy years, and fringe benefits have been a common
feature of American industrial life for most of that period. Mil-
lions of compensation benefits have been paid during this time.
Whether paid voluntarily or in contested and adjudicated cases,
they have always begun with a wage basis calculation that made"wage" mean the "wages" that the worker lives on and not mis-
cellaneous "values" that may or may not someday have a value
to him or her depending on a number of uncontrollable contin-
gencies. Before a single court takes it on itself to say, "We now
tell you, although you didn't know it, you have all been wrongly
calculating wage basis in these millions of cases, and so now, af-
ter seventy years, we are pleased to announce that we have
discovered the true meaning of 'wage' that somehow eluded the
rest of you for seven decades," that court would do well to
undertake a much more penetrating analysis than is visible in
the Circuit Court's opinion in Hilyer of why this revelation was
denied to everyone else for so long.54
In essence, Professor Larson warned against the expansion of
wages to include fringe benefits, such as health insurance, because
such benefits fundamentally differ from board, housing, and fuel.55
51. See Ashby v. Rust Eng'g Co., 559 A.2d 774 (Me. 1989); Ex parte Murray, 490 So. 2d
1238, 1240-41 (Ala. 1986); Ragland v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 724 P.2d 519, 521 (Alaska
1986); Meeker v. Provenant Health Partners, 929 P.2d 26, 29 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
52. See, e.g., Ex parte Murray, 490 So. 2d at 1240 (holding Alabama statute's definition of
"wages," which includes "allowances of any character," was broad enough to encompass em-
ployer-provided health insurance in the computation of "average weekly wage").
53. See, e.g., Munroe Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Ricker, 489 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(overturning a decision including in the calculation of the claimant's average weekly wage the
value of social security taxes, vacation benefits and sick leave benefits because none or these
benefits had vested). But see Jess Parrish Mem'l Hosp. v. Ansell, 390 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that the value of group health insurance premiums were includable in the
determination of the claimant's average weekly wage because her injuries were such to make the
benefit vest).
54. 5 LARSON, supra note 4, § 93.01(2)(b), at 93-20.
55. Professor Larson is also a primary author of the Model Act for Workers' Compensa-
tion, which includes in wages the "reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging, fuel or simi-
lar advantage received from the employer." 10 LARSON, supra note 4, at App. F-9, F-14.
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C. Washington's Statutory Approach
Like LHWCA, Washington's IIA enumerates, as part of wages,
in-kind components furnished by an employer. Nevertheless, Wash-
ington courts have been reluctant to follow other jurisdictions because
IIA is unique.56 The courts have favored a broad construction of IIA's
provisions, including the definition of "wages.""
For the purposes of IIA, RCW 51.08.178 provides, "The term
'wages' shall include the reasonable value of board, housing, fuel or
consideration of like nature received from the employer as part of the
contract of hire . .5.8."" In essence, the statute creates three categories
of consideration: (1) board, housing, and fuel; (2) "other consideration
of like nature" to board, housing, and fuel; and (3) other consideration
not "of like nature" to board, housing, and fuel. Washington courts
have interpreted the phrase "consideration of like nature" to include
consideration furnished in cash. 9 Prior to Cockle, however, the courts
had not determined which consideration furnished in kind (i.e., non-
cash work benefits) other than board, housing, and fuel are part of
wages.
III. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT DECISION IN COCKLE
In Cockle, the Washington Supreme Court held, for the first
time, that the value of health care premiums paid by the employer
should be included in the basis used to determine workers' compensa-
tion payments under IIA.6°
56. See Stertz v. Indus. Ins. Comm'n., 91 Wash. 588, 604, 158 P. 256, 262 (1916) (stating
that to seek authority in the decisions of other states is useless because other workers' compensa-
tion statutes have no resemblance to IIA).
57. See Dennis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash. 2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295, 1297
(1987) (stating that IIA is to be liberally construed and citing cases both predating and postdat-
ing the 1971 codification of this principle).
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.178(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
59. See Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Shearer, 102 Wash. App. 336, 340, 8 P.3d 310, 312 (2000)
(holding that Shearer's monthly wages should include hours for which she was paid holiday, sick,
vacation, and funeral benefits because these benefits are not in-kind consideration but rather are
payments in cash), review denied, 143 Wash. 2d 1003, 21 P.3d 290 (2001); Rose v. Dep't Labor
& Indus., 57 Wash. App. 751, 758, 790 P.2d 201, 205 (holding that $1 per day was consideration
for the work done by a prison inmate because wages includes "any and all forms of consideration
received by the employee from the employer in exchange for work performed."), review denied,
115 Wash. 2d 1010, 797 P.2d 512 (1990).
60. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 823, 16 P.3d at 594.
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A. Facts
In November 1994, Dianne Cockle was injured while working
for the Pierce County Rural Library District (District).61 Under her
employment contract, Cockle was paid $5.61 per hour plus medical
and dental benefits.62 The parties stipulated that the value of her
health care coverage was $205.52 per month.63
Initially, Cockle was eligible for time-loss benefits because she
was unable to work. 64 Once she was able to return to work on a part-
time basis, she was entitled to loss of earning power benefits.65 Be-
cause she was unable to work the minimum hours required under the
District's health care program, Cockle's medical and dental benefits
were suspended.66 The Department then calculated her workers'
compensation payments based solely upon her paycheck at the time of
injury, excluding consideration of her loss of health care coverage.67
The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board) affirmed the
Department's order.68  Both the superior court and the court of ap-
peals found, however, that Cockle's health insurance represented
"other consideration of like nature received from the employer as part
of the contract of hire," and therefore should have been included in
the calculation of her wages.69 The Washington Supreme Court
agreed, but modified the court of appeals's method of calculating the
"reasonable value" of Cockle's health care coverage and remanded the
case to the Department for recalculation of her compensation.7"
61. Id. at 805, 16 P.3d at 585.
62. Id. Cockle's employment contract also provided vacation benefits valued at $28.92 a
month. Appellant's Brief, supra note 11, at 5. Although the issue of whether vacation benefits
are included in wages was litigated below, the parties did not appeal the issue nor did the Wash-
ington Supreme Court address it. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 805 n.1, 16 P.3d at 585 n.1.
63. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 1-2, Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash.
2d 801, 16 P.3d 583 (2000) (No. 68539-8).
64. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 806, 16 P.3d at 585 (citing WASH. REV. CODE §
51.32.090(1)).
65. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090(3)(a)(ii)).
66. Id.
67. Id. The Department calculated Cockle's time-loss rate to be $362.46. To arrive at that
figure, the Department multiplied her monthly wage ($510.51) by 0.71 based on her status as a
married person with three dependents pursuant to RCW 51.32.090(1) and 51.32.060(1)(d). The
Department, however, miscalculated those figures. It conceded that the correct monthly wage
was $987.36 and the time loss $701.03. Appellant's Brief, supra note 11, at 4.
68. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 806, 16 P.3d at 585.
69. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.178(1)).
70. Id. at 823, 16 P.3d at 594.
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B. The Legal Argument in Cockle
The primary issue before the Washington Supreme Court was
whether the value of employer-provided health insurance should be
included in the basis used to calculate workers' compensation pay-
ments under IIA.1 Because RCW 51.08.178 expands the "'ordinary'
dictionary meaning of 'wages,' . . . to include the 'reasonable value' of
in-kind work benefits such as 'board, housing, [and] fuel,' 72 the
court's analysis focused on the "critical" phrase "other consideration
of like nature. '73 IIA, however, does not identify which in-kind work
benefits are "of like nature" to board, housing, and fuel. Specifically,
IIA does not indicate whether the term "wages" is meant to encom-
pass employer-provided benefits such as medical and dental benefits.
Therefore, the court needed to determine whether the Legislature in-
tended health insurance to be part of the wage definition in RCW
51.08.178.
The parties offered different arguments about which characteris-
tic shared by board, housing, and fuel should determine the scope of
"other consideration of like nature." Cockle emphasized the in-kind
nature of board, housing, and fuel as the unifying characteristic. She
claimed (1) that IIA's purpose is to minimize a worker's suffering and
economic loss by providing for disability compensation based upon
lost wage earning capacity; (2) that the worker's "earning capacity"
must necessarily include all payments that the worker was receiving,
in cash or in kind, at the time of injury; and (3) that board, housing,
and fuel are common examples of wage payments in kind.74 There-
fore, Cockle insisted that the Legislature intended "to give 'wages' a
practical, flexible meaning" by refusing to exclude employment com-
pensation simply because it is paid in a form other than money.7"
On the other hand, the Department argued that health insurance
is not "consideration of like nature" to board, housing, and fuel. Ex-
panding upon Morrison-Knudsen's analysis, the Department reasoned
that unlike health insurance, board, housing, and fuel are (1) "tangible
goods and direct services," (2) "valued by determining the market
value of the goods and services actually consumed by the worker," (3)
consumed "on a daily basis," (4) provided by the employer "to make
the worker more readily accessible to work, or as a special incentive,"
71. Id. at 805, 16 P.3d at 584 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.178).
72. Id. at 808, 16 P.3d at 586.
73. Id.
74. Supplemental Brief of Respondent at 7-14, Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142
Wash. 2d 801, 16 P.3d 583 (2000) (No. 68539-8).
75. Id. at 11.
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(5) often used by employers to offset money wages, and (6) "generally
taxable by the [Internal Revenue Service]." 76 For these reasons, the
Department asserted that it has long excluded employer-provided
health insurance from its computation of workers' compensation and
that the Legislature acquiesced by not modifying the phrase "other
consideration of like nature." 7
In addition, the Department stated a number of policy reasons
for excluding employer-provided health insurance from the definition
of "wages." First, expanding wages to encompass health benefits
would permit double recovery where such benefits are continued dur-
ing the disability period. Second, including medical and dental bene-
fits in IIA's definition of "wages" would make workers' compensation
costly, burdensome, and time-consuming rather than prompt, sure,
and certain. 9 Finally, the Department warned of a potential "flood of
litigation" over which modern benefits should be included in the term
"wages" under RCW 51.08.178.0
Considering these arguments, the Washington Supreme Court
held that Cockle's wages included her employer-provided health in-
surance.81  The court reasoned that medical and dental benefits are
"consideration of like nature" to "board, housing, [and] fuel" in that
such benefits represent "readily identifiable and reasonably calculable
in-kind component[s of a worker's] lost earning capacity at the time of
injury that is critical to protecting workers' basic health and sur-
vival. "82
C. The Majority and Minority Opinions
In analyzing whether employer-provided health insurance should
be included in the term "wages" under RCW 51.08.178, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court considered principles of statutory construction,
legislative history, and relevant case law. The Cockle majority and
76. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, supra note 63, at 7-8.
77. Id. at 4. The Department contended:
For nearly 30 years, the Department has interpreted RCW 51.08.178 as not including
health insurance in "monthly wage." The Legislature has amended the statute four
times over the past 28 years and has not changed the statute to include health insur-
ance. The Legislature has thus acquiesced to the Department's construction of the
statute.
Id.
78. Id. at 12.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, supra note 63, at 17 ("As the Morrison-Knudsen Court
explained.... such a flood of litigation makes the compensation process anything but prompt,
sure or certain.").
81. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 805, 16 P.3d at 584.
82. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.178(1)).
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dissent used the same standards to arrive at decidedly different views
of wages.
1. The Statutory Analysis
The Cockle majority began its analysis by referring to the defini-
tion of "wages" in RCW 51.08.178(1).83 Citing Dennis v. Department
of Labor & Industries,84 the majority found that the term "wages"
should not be given its ordinary meaning because the Legislature
manifested a contrary intent to include the reasonable value of certain
in-kind benefits.8" The majority further found that the wage defini-
tion was ambiguous because the definition does not specify what
qualifies as "other consideration of like nature" and the parties pro-
posed equally reasonable interpretations.8 6
Once a Washington court determines that a statute is ambigu-
ous, the court may resort to canons of statutory construction to give
meaning to the legislative action. 7  Ejusdem generis is a well-
established rule of statutory construction, providing "when a general
word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general
word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of
the same type as those listed."88 Applying the ejusdem generis rule, the
majority found that the Legislature's specific choice of words ruled out
both exceedingly narrow and exceedingly broad readings of the phrase
"consideration of like nature."89 The majority reasoned:
The Legislature here decided against restricting qualifying bene-
fits to a closed list of enumerated items. It also chose the word"consideration," a term understood broadly in the law and used
in the definition of "wages" in the workers' compensation acts of
few, if any, other jurisdictions. On the other hand, it did not
mandate inclusion in "wages" of "any other consideration," but
rather of "other consideration of like nature," suggesting that a
more limited ejusdem generis construction was intended.9°
83. Id. at 807, 16 P.3d at 585.
84. 109 Wash. 2d 467, 479-80, 745 P.2d 1295, 1302 (1987).
85. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 808, 16 P.3d at 586.
86. Id.
87. See Philip A. Talmadge, A New Approach to Statutory Interpretation in Washington, 25
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 179, 192-99 (2001).
88. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (7th ed. 1999); Simpson Inv. Co. v. State, 141 Wash.
2d. 139, 156-57, 3 P.3d 741, 750 (2000) ("In other words, the precise terms modify, influence or
restrict the interpretation or application of the general terms where both are used in sequence or
collocation in legislative enactments.").
89. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 808-10, 16 P.3d at 586-87.
90. Id. at 809-10, 16 P.3d at 587.
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Therefore, while it did not enumerate all qualifying benefits, the
Legislature expressly mandated inclusion of the "reasonable value" of
all "consideration of like nature received from the employer as part of
the contract of hire" in the calculation of an injured worker's
"wages.""
In contrast, the dissent argued that the plain language of RCW
51.08.178 excludes employer-provided health insurance from wages
because the Legislature specifically referenced various forms of com-
pensation as opposed to fringe benefits.92 The dissent recognized that
the Legislature referenced board, housing, and fuel in the statute. But
the dissent noted that these items are typically associated with workers
traveling or living somewhere other than their usual residence at the
employer's request.93 According to the dissent, the phrase "other con-
sideration of a like nature" corresponds better to these circumstances.94
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the words used by the Legisla-
ture did not include so-called "core, nonfringe benefits" such as health
insurance."
Furthermore, the dissent found that the interplay between the
statutory provision defining the "average monthly wage" and Wash-
ington's Employment Security Act96 illustrates legislative intent to ex-
clude employer-provided health insurance from IIA's definition of
"wages."" The dissent reasoned: "It would seem exceedingly anoma-
lous for the Legislature to include benefits within the definition of
wages under the Act and yet cap the calculation of wages for purposes
of time loss payments by a figure that expressly excludes the payment
of such benefits."" The dissent found the majority's analysis as im-
plying that the definition of "wages" for time-loss benefits in RCW
91. Id. at 810 n.4, 16 P.3d at 587 n.4 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.178).
92. Id. at 826-27, 16 P.3d at 595-96 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 826, 16 P.3d at 595-96 (Talmadge, J, dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 831, 16 P.3d at 598 (Talmadge, J., dissenting). Justice Talmadge noted that,
since 1971, the Legislature has not compensated Washington workers by adding their medical
and dental coverage to the definition of "wages" in RCW 51.08.178. Id. at 827 n.1, 16 P.3d at
596 n.1. Chief Justice Guy, in his concurrence in dissent, also articulated this view. Id. at 835-
36, 16 P.3d at 600 (Guy, C.J., concurring in dissent).
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.355 (2000).
97. Id. at 827, 16 P.3d at 596 (Talmadge, J., dissenting). Under 11A, time loss is paid pur-
suant to RCW 51.32.090. The calculation of time-loss compensation is derived from RCW
51.32.060. While an injured worker is entitled to be paid a portion of his or her wages, the bene-
fits received by the worker are capped on the basis of the "average monthly wage." Washing-
ton's "average monthly wage" is defined in RCW 51.08.018, which references the Employment
Security Act (ESA), chapter 50.04 of RCW. The ESA, in turn, specifically exempts from the
definition of "wages" various fringe benefits. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.330 (2000).
98. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 827, 16 P.3d at 596 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
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51.08.178 might not extend to other IIA provisions.99 IIA, however,
does not distinguish between time-loss, pension, or death benefits.
100
Therefore, the dissent stressed that the majority did not provide a
clear standard as to whether "core, nonfringe benefits" are recoverable
when a worker or a worker's beneficiary receives a pension or death
benefits.'
2. The Legislative History Analysis
The Cockle majority next consulted IA's legislative history,
which in the majority's view decisively confirmed its interpretation
that wages include employer-provided health insurance.1 2 Since IIA's
enactment in 1911, compensation rates had been legislatively fixed.0 3
The 1971 Amendments to IIA added a "wages" section to its defini-
tional chapter and made compensation proportional to a worker's ac-
tual earnings at the time of injury. 4 Furthermore, the Legislature
provided a liberal construction mandate.' The majority reasoned
that, taken together, the perceived benefits of the 1971 Amendments
and the liberal construction mandate showed legislative intent to in-
clude in wages the reasonable value of such in-kind work benefits as
health insurance. 1
06
In addition, the Cockle majority was not persuaded by the De-
partment's argument that logical inferences from other IIA provisions
show legislative intent to exclude benefits from the definition of
"wages" in RCW 51.08.178(1).107 For example, in the majority's
99. Id. at 832, 16 P.3d at 598-59 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 832, 16 P.3d at 598 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 832 n.4, 16 P.3d at 598 n.4 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 811-14, 16 P.3d at 587-89.
103. Id. at 810, 16 P.3d at 587.
104. Id. (citing WASH .REv. CODE § 51.08.178(1) (2000); Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch.
289, § 14.).
105. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.010 (2000) ("This Title shall be liberally construed for the
purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or
death occurring in the course of employment.").
106. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 810-11, 16 P.3d at 587. The majority said:
This change had at least three perceived benefits. First, the change will assure a more
equitable and realistic basis for compensation. Second, the change will have an incen-
tive effect of reducing the number of cases where time-loss benefits exceed the wages
that would otherwise have been earned. Third, compensation levels would automati-
cally keep pace with wages increases, making it unnecessary to go to the legislature
with hat in hand each time a benefit increase is sought.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 813, 16 P.3d at 588-89. The Department stated that some IIA provisions have
capped monthly compensation at levels between 100% and 150% of the state's "average monthly
wage," as defined in RCW 51.08.018. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, supra note 63, at 9. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.050(3), (5) (2000) (death-based pension); WASH. REV. CODE §
51.32.060(5) (2000) (permanent total disability pension); WASH. REV. CODE §
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view, IIA's reference to the "average annual wage" in Title 50 of
RCW did not clarify whether the 1971 Legislature intended em-
ployer-provided health insurance to be included in the wage defini-
tion.' Similarly, the majority found that RCW 51.32.090(4)(c) does
not logically support excluding benefits from wages merely because
"the Legislature, after hearing from various interest groups, chose to
require employers to reinstate the preexisting health benefits of work-
ers suffering temporary partial disability."
0 9 ,
In contrast, the dissent asserted that the Legislature imported a
traditional view of wages into IIA."0 When the Legislature enacted
IIA in 1911, a person who performed services without payment of
wages constituted a volunteer and was not covered under the Act."
The dissent discerned that wages, as part of the traditional coverage
determination under IIA, evidences legislative intent to exclude em-
ployer-provided health insurance for the purpose of computing work-
ers' compensation payments."
3. The Case Law Analysis
The Cockle majority reasoned that Washington case law supports
the statutory mandate that the reasonable value of in-kind benefits
similar to board, housing, and fuel be included in the wage definition
under RCW 51.08.178.11' In support of this proposition, the majority
quoted Dennis v. Department of Labor & Industries' :
51.32.090(3)(a)(ii) (2000) (combined payments for payments of temporary partial disability
benefits and wages); WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090(7) (2000) (temporary total disability bene-
fits). According to the Department, "our Legislature has demonstrated that the 'state average
wage' for purposes of RCW Title 51, like the 'national average weekly wage' in Morrison-
Knudsen, does not include fringe benefits." Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, supra note 63, at 9.
108. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 814, 16 P.3d at 589.
109. Id. RCW 51.32.090(4)(c) mandates that "any employee health and welfare benefits
that the worker was receiving at the time of injury shall continue or be resumed at the level pro-
vided at the time of injury." The Department argued the statute shows legislative recognition
"that wage-based disability benefits do not include, in the computation of the 'monthly wage,' a
value reflecting 'health and welfare benefits that the worker received on the job before the in-
jury."' Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, supra note 63, at 10 (quoting House Bill Report of HB
1246). The majority disagreed and held that the statute "means that restoration of a recovering
workers' preexisting health benefits reduces the 'actual difference between the worker's present
wages and earning power at the time of injury' under RCW 51.32.090(3)(a)(ii), mitigating the
loss of earning power accordingly." Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d. at 814, 16 P.3d at 589 (quoting
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090(3)(a)(ii)) (2000)).
110. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 828, 16 P.3d at 596 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (quoting Laws of 1911, ch. 74, § 3 at 348; and WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.035(1)
(2000)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 811-12, 16 P.3d at 587-88.
114. 109 Wash. 2d 467, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987).
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[T]he guiding principle in construing provisions of the Indus-
trial Insurance Act is that the Act is remedial in nature and is to
be liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose of provid-
ing compensation to all covered employees injured in their em-
ployment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker." 5
The majority also noted that in Double D Hop Ranch v. San-
chez," 6 the Washington Supreme Court held that an injured worker
should be compensated based upon his or her actual "lost earning ca-
pacity" rather than on an arbitrarily set figure." 7 Therefore, the ma-
jority declared that Cockle was capable, at the time of her injury, of
earning her hourly wages plus full health care coverage."'
Although the Legislature left the language of RCW 51.08.178
unaltered despite the Department's interpretation of "wages" as ex-
cluding health insurance, the Cockle majority declined to follow that
interpretation. 19 The majority asserted that an agency's interpretation
is not binding on the Washington Supreme Court, but did not address
the Department's argument about legislative acquiescence. 20  The
majority simply reasoned that "legislative acquiescence can never be
interpreted as permission to ignore or violate statutory mandates.'
121
The majority concluded that the Department's interpretation could
not be reconciled with IIA's liberal construction mandate.
122
Finally, the majority found that the Department relied too heav-
ily on Morrison-Knudsen for the proposition that employer-provided
health insurance is a fringe benefit and should not be included in a
statutory definition of "wages.' ' 123  Although the Morrison-Knudsen
Court was also under a mandate to liberally construe LHWCA, the
majority agreed with the Court of Appeals in Cockle124 that the federal
115. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 811, 16 P.3d at 587 (quoting Dennis v. Dep't of Labor &
Indus., 109 Wash. 2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987)).
116. 133 Wash. 2d 793, 947 P.2d 727 (1997).
117. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 811, 16 P.3d at 588 (citing Double D Hop Ranch, 133 Wash.
2d at 798).
118. Id. at 811, 16 P.3d at 588.
119. Id. at 811-12, 16 P.3d at 588.
120. Id. at 812, 16 P.3d at 588 (citing City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth
Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38, 46, 959 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1998) ("We accord deference
to an agency interpretation of the law where the agency has specialized expertise in dealing with
such issues, but we are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute.").
121. Id. at 812, 16 P.3d at 588; cf. Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Landon, 117 Wash. 2d 122,
127, 814 P.2d 626, 628 (1991) (finding that, although the Department claimed that the Legisla-
ture acquiesced, the Department presented no evidence that its interpretation had actually at-
tracted the Legislature's attention before the amendment).
122. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 812, 16 P.3d at 588 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.010
(2000)).
123. Id. at 815, 16 P.3d at 590.
124. The court of appeals stated:
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case conflicted with Washington law. 2' The majority also noted that
other jurisdictions criticized and distinguished Morrison-Knudsen.
126
Therefore, the majority likewise declined to follow the Morrison-
Knudsen reasoning.121
The dissent offered a different case law analysis to buttress its in-
terpretation of RCW 51.08.178. Although the definition of "wages"
gained more significance when the 1971 amendments created the pre-
sent statutory scheme for payment of time-loss benefits, the dissent
found that wages were a part of coverage determinations under IIA
from its inception in 1911.128 For example, the dissent cited Kirk v.
Department of Labor & Industries'29 for the proposition that coverage
under 11A is generally determined by a worker's receipt of wages. 3 '
The dissent also relied upon a Washington State Attorney General
opinion that involved student nurses from the University of Washing-
ton who served for a six-week training period at the Firland Sanitar-
ium.'3' Although they remained students and did not receive a defi-
nite wage, the student nurses received room, board, and fuel as
remuneration for their services.'32 The dissent found that eligibility
for coverage under 11A, with respect to room, board, and other similar
types of compensation, was designed to address peripatetic employees
like the student nurses at Firland Sanitarium.' The dissent therefore
concluded that the Legislature never contemplated that benefits would
be part of the wage definition under RCW 51.08.178.14
The LHWCA, according to the Morrison-Knudsen Court, is not a simple remedial
statute intended for the benefit of the workers. The Washington Act, in stark con-
trast, is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed, with doubts resolved in
favor of the worker. Its goal is to insure fair compensation of disabled workers.
Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 96 Wash. App. 69, 84, 977 P.2d 668, 676 (1999) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 819-20, 16 P.3d at 592.
126. Id. at 820 n.9, 16 P.3d at 592 n.9 (citing Ex Parte Murray, 490 So. 2d 1238, 1240-41
(Ala. 1986); Ragland v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 724 P.2d 519, 521 (Alaska 1986); Meeker v.
Provenant Health Partners, 929 P.2d 26, 29 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); and Ashby v. Rust Eng'g
Co., 559 A.2d 774 (Me. 1989)).
127. Id. at 820, 16 P.3d at 592.
128. Id. at 827-28, 16 P.3d at 596 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
129. 192 Wash. 671, 74 P.2d 227 (1937) (holding a person, who went into the woods with
his neighbor on Sunday to assist the neighbor in obtaining firewood for sale without agreeing to
specific compensation, was not covered under IIA).
130. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 828, 16 P.3d at 596 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (citing 53-55 Op. Att'y Gen. 240 (1954) available at
http://www.wa.gov/ago/opinions/1953-55/opinion_1953- 55_240.html).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 828-29, 16 P.3d at 597 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 829, 16 P.3d at 597 (Talmadge, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Guy in his concur-
rence in dissent recognized the difference between the majority and dissent as to the origins of
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The dissent further argued that Washington case law supports
deference to the Department's interpretation of IIA's wage defini-
tion."' According to the dissent, IIA is plainly a "specialized statu-
tory enactment. "136 Because the Department has expertise in applying
11A and the Board in interpreting industrial insurance law, the dissent
considered the two to be in the best position to determine the meaning
of "wages" under 11A. 3 7 As the agencies charged with carrying out
IIA's provisions, neither the Department nor the Board ever consid-
ered fringe benefits, including medical and dental coverage, as falling
within the definition of "wages."' 38 Therefore, the dissent concluded
that substantial deference should be given to these agencies' interpre-
tations of RCW 51.08.178."39
4. The Policy Analysis
The Cockle majority addressed three policy concerns raised by
the Department. First, the majority dismissed the Department's
warning that expanding wages to encompass employer-provided
health insurance would lead to double recovery when medical and
dental coverage is continued during the worker's disability period. 4
The majority noted that "any portion of 'wages' that injured workers
continue to enjoy during their disability period is not part of their
'economic loss.'" 141
Second, the majority was not persuaded by the Department's ar-
gument that including employer-provided heath insurance in wages
the wording at issue. He emphasized, however, the importance of the 1971 enactment of IIA's
wage definition:
[B]ecause RCW 51.08.178 was actually enacted in 1971, the listing of only board,
housing and fuel as benefits which count as wages indicates "other consideration of
like nature" should be construed narrowly.... [H]ealth or medical insurance was a
significant form of fringe benefits in 1971, [and] the Legislature's failure to list it ex-
pressly indicates the Legislature did not consider it to be "wages." It is unlikely the
Legislature would relegate such an important kind of fringe benefit to the category of
"other consideration of like nature."
Id. at 835, 16 P.3d at 600 (Guy, C.J., concurring in dissent).
135. Id. at 829, 16 P.3d at 597 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.14, 51.52.010 (2000)). The Department adminis-
ters Washington's industrial insurance fund and regulates self-insured employers. The Board
consists of representatives from labor, management, and the public.
138. Id.
139. Id. "Where an administrative agency is charged with administering a special field of
law and endowed with quasi-judicial functions because of its expertise in that field, the agency's
construction of statutory words and phrases and legislative intent should be accorded substantial
weight when undergoing judicial review." Overton v. Washington State Econ. Assistance Auth.,
96 Wash. 2d 552, 555, 637 P.2d 652, 654 (1981).
140. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 814-15, 16 P.3d at 597.
141. Id. at 815 n.6, 16 P.3d at 589 n.6 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.010 (2000)).
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would make Washington's workers' compensation system costly, bur-
densome, and time-consuming.1 2 The majority recognized that com-
pensation is designed to provide "prompt, sure, [and] certain" relief
for injured workers, but noted that the Department could not disre-
gard statutory provisions merely for their administrative inconven-
ience. 43  Instead, the majority found that the reasonable value of
health insurance should be measured by the monthly premium actu-
ally paid by an employer rather than the insurance's "hypothetical"
market value.'44 In doing so, the majority acknowledged the Depart-
ment's concern that adding the hypothetical replacement cost of health
insurance to workers' compensation rates would be prohibitively ex-
pensive and would require "lengthy investigation and consultation of
experts."' 45 The majority concluded that an employer's contribution
or payment constitutes a "readily identifiable" and "reasonable"
measure to ascertain the value of employer-provided benefits.' 46
Finally, the majority ignored the Department's warning of a po-
tential flood of litigation over what kind of modern work benefits
should be included in IIA's definition of "wages."' 47 Although the
majority recognized an inherent weakness in the phrase "other consid-
eration of like nature" in RCW 51.08.178(1), 48 the majority found
that its application of the ejusdem generis rule substantially addressed
the Department's concerns.'49 The majority noted that health insur-
ance is "of like nature" to "board, housing, [and] fuel" because such
insurance is "objectively critical" to protecting the basic health and
survival of workers. 5 Furthermore, the majority emphasized that its
construction carries out IIA's perceived purpose of minimizing an in-
142. Id. at 820, 16 P.3d at 592.
143. Id. (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wash. 2d 128, 138, 814 P.2d 629, 634
(1991)).
144. The majority rejected as unnecessary the Court of Appeal's hypothetical objective
buyer-seller standard for ascertaining the reasonable value of employer-provided benefits. Id. at
820-21, 16 P.3d at 592.
145. Id. at 820 n.10, 16 P.3d at 592 n.10 (quoting Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, supra
note 63, at 16, 18, App. E.).
146. The majority agreed with Justice Marshall that "[w]hile an employer's contribution
may understate the true value of the benefits received. . .. it nonetheless provides a readily iden-
tifiable and therefore reasonable surrogate for the 'advantage' received ... [and] has long been
accepted as a reasonable measure of the value of fringe benefits .. " Id. at 821 n.10, 16 P.3d at
592 n.10 (quoting Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs,
461 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1983) (Marshall, J. dissenting)).
147. Id. at 821, 16 P.3d at 593.
148. Id. ("[T]he Legislature's current mandate to include 'other consideration of like na-
ture' to 'board, housing, [and] fuel' is ambiguous and by no means easily applied to all in-kind
work benefits the offered by employers today.").
149. Id.
150. Id. at 822-23 n.13, 16 P.3d at 594 n.13.
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jured worker's "suffering and economic loss."' 1 Therefore, the phrase
"board, housing, fuel, or other consideration of like nature" means
"readily identifiable and reasonably calculable in-kind components of
a worker's lost earning capacity at the time of injury that are critical to
protecting workers' basic health and survival," including medical and
dental coverage.
1 12
In its policy analysis, the dissent expressed concern about the
practical implications of the majority's policymaking. "[T]he majority
offers very little guidance to the Department or self-insured employers
as to what its policy for the scope of benefits under [IIA] will mean in
the real world."'5 3 Employers offer numerous types of benefits to em-
ployees as consideration for employment, and these benefits are, there-
fore, generally part of collective bargaining between labor and man-
agement. 15 4  The dissent argued, however, that courts cannot
adequately determine what benefits would be "core" to a particular in-
jured worker.' Instead, the dissent asserted that the decision to alter
IIA's wage definition should be left to the Legislature because that
body is better equipped to hear from all parties concerned and to bal-
ance the interests of employers against the needs of injured workers.5 6
5. The Conclusions
The Cockle majority concluded that the definition of "wages" in
RCW 51.08.178 included Cockle's employer-provided health insur-
ance because the premiums paid by her employer in exchange for her
labor constituted a "core, nonfringe" component of her lost wages."'
As a consequence, the majority found that the Department should
have added the value of Cockle's medical and dental coverage to her
wage basis when it calculated her worker's compensation payments."'
The majority stated, however, that IIA would not provide a remedy
where an injured worker was deprived of the reasonable value of em-
ployer-provided benefits that are not critical to protecting his or her
basic health and survival. ' 9 In the final analysis, the majority decided
that a worker's injury-caused deprivation of health care coverage ob-
151. Id. at 822, 16 P.3d at 593 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.010 (2000)).
152. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.178(1) (2000)).
153. Id. at 831, 16 P.3d at 598 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 834, 16 P.3d 599 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
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jectively qualifies as "the suffering and economic loss" that IIA was
designed to remedy. 60
On the other hand, the dissent concluded that employer-
provided health insurance is a fringe benefit, which the Legislature
specifically excluded from the definition of "wages" in RCW
51.08.178.161 The dissent rejected the majority's interpretation of the
phrase "other consideration of like nature" and argued that the major-
ity's interpretation has no principled limitation because many other
types of employer-provided benefits constitute "necessities of life" or
"core, nonfringe benefits." '162 The dissent also declined to follow the
view that wages constitute any consideration received by the worker,
including medical and dental coverage.'63 The dissent would have re-
versed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the Department's
and the Board's decisions.'64
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE COCKLE DECISION
Given the strong disagreement between the majority and the dis-
sent in Cockle over IIA's wage definition for calculating workers' com-
pensation, this Section will first address the general question of
whether injured workers' wages should include the value of employer-
provided health insurance. This Section will then argue that the
Cockle majority misinterpreted the term "wages" in RCW 51.08.178
and effectively adopted a definition that produces strained results
when applied to other IIA provisions. Finally, this Section will en-
courage the Legislature to limit the scope of the Cockle decision by
narrowing IIA's wage definition.
A. Cockle Inappropriately Broadened the Definition of "Wages" by
Including Employer-Provided Health Insurance
In considering whether wages includes benefits, it must be noted
that employers provide a variety of benefits to employees as induce-
ments or consideration for employment. 6  Furthermore, monetary
160. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.010 (2000)).
161. Id. at 834, 16 P.3d at 600 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 824, 16 P.3d at 594 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 830-31, 16 P.3d at 598 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 834, 16 P.3d at 599 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
165. As Justice Talmadge noted in dissent:
Such benefits might include life insurance benefits, stock option plans, deferred com-
pensation plans, profit sharing plans, dependent care assistance plans, group legal ser-
vices plans, interest free or low interest loan programs, savings plans, 401(k) matching
plans, sick leave benefits, vacation benefits, death and disability benefits, charitable
contributions matching programs, employer-funded scholarships and fellowships, tui-
tion waivers, and alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs.
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compensation and benefits combined will usually form the basis of the
employment agreement between labor and business as a result of their
collective bargaining. 6 6 Whether classified as in-cash or in-kind con-
sideration, employer-provided benefits are typically referred to as
fringe benefits, not a part of wages.
16 7
1. The Characterization Problem
In Cockle, the majority found that board, housing, fuel, and
health care are "core, nonfringe benefits" that all share the "like na-
ture" of being "readily identifiable and reasonably calculable in-kind
components of a worker's lost earning capacity."'' 6' The distinction
between "fringe" and "nonfringe" becomes important because the lat-
ter implies that the value of the benefit, like a worker's wages, is in-
deed readily identifiable and reasonably calculable.
The Cockle majority correctly stated that the definition of
"wages" in RCW 51.08.178 does not include merely "any other con-
sideration," but rather "other consideration of like nature" to board,
housing, and fuel. 169 Although the majority acknowledged that the
Legislature intended a more limited construction of the term "wages,"
the majority's reasoning leads to a contradictory result. 17' The major-
ity noted "the Legislature's express mandate that the 'reasonable
value' of all 'consideration of like nature from the employer as part of
the contract of hire' be included in the calculation of every injured
worker's 'wages."''" The majority also observed that "the language of
RCW 51.08.178(1) suggests the Legislature intended 'wages' to in-
clude the reasonable value of all core, nonfringe benefits critical to
Id. at 831, 16 P.3d at 598 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
166. See Employees of Pac. Mar. Ass'n. v. Hutt, 88 Wash. 2d 426, 434, 562 P.2d 1264,
1269 (1977) (describing a labor dispute concerning wages, benefits, and working conditions that
were determined by the results of negotiations between striking workers and the employers' asso-
ciation); see also Thomas A. Kochan, Labor Policy for the Twenty-First Century, 1 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 117 (1998) (discussing modern trends in collective bargaining over wages, benefits,
and employment conditions).
167. See Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Bentley, 38 Wash. App. 152, 159, 684 P.2d 793,
797 (1984) ("While benefits may be included as part of compensation, generally benefits are con-
sidered separately from salary."). "We assume that 'benefits' refers to what is commonly called
'fringe benefits."' Id. at 158 n.1, 684 P.2d at 797 n.1; see also Scholtfeld v. Mel's Heating & Air
Conditioning, 445 N.W.2d 918, 927 (Neb. 1989) (stating that fringe benefits are not part of the
wage contract because they are not the result of an employee's individual labor, but rather the
fruit of collective bargaining).
168. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 822, 16 P.3d at 594.
169. Id. at 810, 16 P.3d at 587.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 809 n.4, 16 P.3d at 587 n.4 (emphasis added) (citing WASH. REV. CODE §
51.08.178).
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protecting workers' basic health [and] survival. 1 12  This language,
however, sounds similar to the "any and all forms of consideration"
standard in Rose,'73 which the Cockle majority expressly rejected." 4
The Cockle majority appears to address this problem by limiting
the scope of "other consideration of like nature" to "core, nonfringe
benefits."' In addition, the majority stated that IIA does not con-
template including the value of "fringe benefits" that are not critical to
protecting workers' basic health and survival. 6 However, in compar-
ing the phrases "other consideration of like nature" and "board, hous-
ing, [and] fuel," it appears that the majority's decision would not nec-
essarily be restricted to employer-provided health insurance. Instead,
the interpretation of the phrase "other consideration of like nature"
might encompass all other in-kind "fringe" or "nonfringe" benefits
that are critical to protecting workers' health and survival.'77 For ex-
ample, in In re Douglas A. Jackson,'78 the Board said, "A disability pol-
icy that pays the monthly mortgage obligation of a disabled worker...
arguably is 'of like nature' to employer-provided shelter."' 79 There-
fore, the majority's interpretation leaves room for the inclusion of
172. Id. at 821 n.l, 16 P.3d at 593 n.l (emphasis added).
173. Rose v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 57 Wash. App. 751, 758, 790 P.2d 201, 205, review
denied 115 Wash. 2d 1010, 797 P.2d 512 (1990). The Rose opinion was written by then Appel-
late Judge Gerry Alexander, who now serves as Chief Justice of the Washington Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Alexander presumably remembered the Rose standard when he agreed with the
Cockle majority. This presumption shows a potential flaw in the majority's reasoning that it did
not construe the phrase "other consideration of like nature" to mean "any and all consideration of
like nature" to board, housing and fuel. Arguably, the Rose court took an intellectually honest
view of wages in light of the range of benefits that induce an individual to work.
174. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 821, 16 P.3d at 593.
175. Id. at 822-23, 16 P.3d at 594.
176. Id. Although the facts in Cockle raise the issue of whether medical and dental cover-
age is necessary to protect the "basic health and survival" of the injured worker, this phrase, as
applied to other cases, may include the worker's mental health and financial well-being. See gen-
erally Martha T. McClusky, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform," 50
RUTGERS L. REv. 657 (1998) (discussing statutory restrictions and exclusions for mental stress
claims).
177. See, e.g., Washington Water Power Co. v. Miller, 52 Wash. App. 565, 566, 762 P.2d
16, 17 (1988) (noting that WWP's claimed expenses included wages and amounts to cover vaca-
tion, sick leave, holidays, and other fringe benefits). The Board has also addressed the issue.
See, e.g., In re Melvin Christenson, No. 88 1477 (July 2, 1991), available at http://www.wa.gov/
biia/881477.htm ("Burial expenses, like medical payments, are simply a reimbursement for ser-
vices rendered ... as opposed to prescribed benefits payable to the worker or surviving benefici-
aries."). Arguably, any decisions by the Board that have followed the reasoning in Christenson
would be subject to review under the Cockle decision, because in-kind benefits that are critical to
workers' health and survival are tantamount to prescribed benefits rather than reimbursements.
For periodic updates on the Board's significant decisions, visit http://www.wa.gov/biia/
contents.htm.
178. No. 99 21831 (Aug. 13, 2001), available at http://www.wa.gov/biia/9921831.htm.
179. Id.
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benefits that are usually excludable from the definition of "wages" in
RCW 51.08.178.
2. The Subjectivity Problem
The definition of "wages" should not include employer-provided
health insurance because what constitutes a "core benefit" to an in-
jured worker depends upon personal preferences. For example, al-
though Cockle argued her health insurance was "core" to her well-
being, 180 an older injured worker approaching retirement age may find
that deferred compensation plans and pension benefits constitute a
core benefit. For a younger employee, vacation benefits or tuition as-
sistance programs for children in higher education might equally be a
core benefit. Given the subjectivity inherent in these circumstances, it
would be difficult for courts to ascertain what is core to the health and
survival of each worker.''
The Cockle majority found that core benefits encompass health
care, food, shelter, and heat since these items are "critical to protecting
workers' basic health and survival."' 82  In opposition, the dissent
pointed out that this phrase is tantamount to "necessities of life" and
that health care coverage cannot be found in the statutory language."'
The dissent's view is more persuasive because the Legislature explic-
itly referenced various forms of compensation, but specifically chose
not to mention benefits such as health insurance in the definition of
"wages." Although health benefits are likely "core" to an injured
worker's health and survival, it should not be part of wages because
the Legislature did not mention such coverage in IIA's wage defini-
tion.
3. The Categorization Problem
The outcome in most cases after Cockle will depend upon the
categorization of the benefits themselves, particularly when the worker
claims that the benefits are in-kind and "readily identifiable and rea-
sonably calculable." The benefits in question will either be more
180. In addition to her medical and dental coverage, Cockle initially raised the issue of va-
cation pay. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 806 n.1, 16 P.3d at 585 n.1.
181. The majority noted Cockle's argument that her health care coverage should be in-
cluded in wages, since it provided valuable "present peace of mind" and qualified as "real eco-
nomic gain." Id. at 816 n.8, 16 P.3d at 590 n.8. The majority did not specifically address this
argument, which adds support to the subjective meaning of "core benefits."
182. Id. at 822, 16 P.3d at 594. After the Cockle decision, the Board held that an injured
worker's monthly wages at the time of injury include the reasonable value of employer- provided
medical, dental, and vision insurance benefits. In re Douglas A. Jackson, No. 99 21831, available
at http://www.wa.gov/biia/9921831.htm.
183. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 831, 16 P.3d at 598 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
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properly classified as "core" or "nonfringe" benefits that are critical to
protecting the worker's basic health and survival or merely as fringe
benefits that are not critical to protecting the injured worker's basic
health and survival.
For example, in In re Ronald Tucker,184 the Board determined
that an employer-provided pension benefit was a fringe benefit rather
than a "core" or "nonfringe" benefit and therefore should not be in-
cluded in IIA's wage definition.' Similarly, in In re Douglas A. Jack-
son,'86 the Board held that employer contributions for life insurance
were not wages within the meaning of RCW 51.08.178 because "pur-
chasing this insurance ha[d] nothing to do with the worker's health
and survival, since funds are paid only upon his [or her] death.
'187
This case-by-case determination will inevitably slow down the process
of administering workers' compensation benefits to injured workers.
Therefore, specific factors and methods should be in place to help
guide the Board in making decisions that govern all claims of like na-
ture.18
8
4. The Valuation Problem
Finally, IIA's definition of "wages" should not include em-
ployer-provided health insurance since its value is often difficult to
calculate. Commentators have discussed many health care "cost prob-
lems" such as the rising cost of health care to the economy, the direct
cost of health benefits and programs for the government, and the in-
creasing costs of health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket ex-
penses of consumers.'89 In Washington, the difficulty of ascertaining
the value of health insurance is exacerbated by the state's rising rate of
184. Nos. 00 11573 & 00 17279 (June 22, 2001), available at http://www.wa.gov/biia/
0011573.htm.
185. Id.
186. In re Douglas A. Jackson, No. 99 21831, available at http://www.wa.gov/biia/
9921831.htm.
187. Id.
188. In a recent posting on its website, the Department announced reasons why rules on
this subject may be needed. "The proposed rules would provide the methods and factors used in
calculating a worker's wage at the time of injury or date of manifestation of an occupational dis-
ease. These rules would include clarification of recent Supreme Court interpretations." DEP'T
OF LABOR & INDUS., PROPOSAL STATEMENT OF INQUIRY, WSR-01-20-091 (Oct. 2001),
available at http://www.lni.wa.gov/rules/WorkersCompensation/Industrial-Insurance/
WageCalculation/Preproposal.htm (on file with Seattle University Law Review).
189. See generally WING ET AL., supra note 28, at 1102-03 (discussing and distinguishing
costs of health care to the economy, government, consumers, employers and providers, and other
interest groups).
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the uninsured) 9 ° Under these circumstances, the value placed on
health insurance by the uninsured worker is arguably influenced by
the worker's inadequate risk assessment and lack of income. This
phenomenon has also occurred in cases involving insured workers. 9'
Therefore, all workers assess the value of health insurance differ-
ently.1
92
In Cockle, the majority properly rejected a subjective theory for
measuring the value of benefits. It held that the "reasonable value" of
health care coverage should be measured "by the monthly premium
actually paid by the employer to secure it--or in the case of a group
plan, the worker's portion thereof."' 93 The majority also questioned
why injured workers who were receiving more of their earnings in in-
kind consideration should be given less workers' compensation than
those who were receiving a larger share of their earnings as monetary
pay.'94 Although the majority's argument has some force, its theory
focuses on the "earnings" that a worker receives from his or her em-
190. According to a survey by the United States Census Bureau, Washington's uninsured
rate rose from 12.3% in 1998 and 1999 to 13.8% in 1999 and 2000. Carol Smith, State's uninsured
rate is rising, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sep. 28, 2001, at B-1, available at http://
seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/40655_- health28.shtml. Because of the "economic slump, big
jumps in unemployment, huge increases in health-insurance premiums, and employers' willing-
ness to pass on fast-rising health costs to their workers .... the number of uninsured Americans
today is probably well above 40 million, and is likely to grow in the period ahead." Id. (quoting
Ron Pollack, executive director of Families USA, a non-profit health care advocacy group in
Washington, D.C.).
191. See, e.g., Clark v. Rust Eng'g Co., 595 A.2d 416, (Me. 1991) (holding that the value
employee placed on employer's accident and sickness benefits and life and medical insurance
plans did not fall within the definition of "wages" for workers' compensation purposes).
192. See Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refract-
ing Market Forces, 76 IND. L. J. 29, 47 (2001) ("For example, suppose unhealthy workers cost
$270 to insure. Employers cannot distinguish unhealthy from healthy job applicants, although
the applicants know which they are (and unhealthy applicants, knowing their status, value health
insurance at $300). If so, no employer can remain competitive while offering health insurance to
all workers.").
193. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 821, 16 P.3d at 592. One critic of this Note proposes an ad-
ditional valuation method. In response to the argument that the value of health benefits is diffi-
cult to calculate, Robert Stern of the Washington Labor Council opines: "Have you not heard of
COBRA? One can ascertain the amount paid b[y] the employer quite easily." E-mail from
Robert Stern, to Matthew Adams (Nov. 28, 2001, 12:40 PST) (on file with Seattle University
Law Review). The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA) does
not require employers to pay the premium for health benefit continuation coverage; instead, the
employer may charge up to 102% of the "applicable premium" to cover the costs of administer-
ing the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(3) (1999); Draper v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1287, 1293
(Cal. 1995). Therefore, "the employer can only charge the net cost of providing the continuation
coverage (the premium less experience rebates and dividends)." Roberta Casper Watson,
COBRA Health Continuation Benefits, C940 ALI-ABA 25, 90 (1994); Thomas H. Somers,
COBRA: An Incremental Approach to National Health Insurance, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 141 (1989).
194. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 818, 16 P.3d at 591.
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ployer, leaving open the possibility that the true value of health care
will consist of the employer's contribution and/or the value of the
same benefit derived from a different source.' This possibility com-
plicates the measurement of the "reasonable value" of a benefit like
health care coverage.
Furthermore, some employers who self-insure for workers' com-
pensation also self-insure for their workers' health insurance. These
employers do not pay premiums for health insurance, but directly pay.
their workers' medical bills. 9 6 Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the
cash value of health benefits to these workers, especially when they
overuse medical services to justify workers' compensation payments,
as they often do.'97
The majority attempts to address the valuation of benefits by
relegating the phrase "other consideration of like nature" to "readily
identifiable and reasonably calculable in-kind components of a
worker's lost earning capacity at the time of injury."' 98 The majority's
conclusion that health insurance falls within the definition of "other
consideration of like nature" is aided by the parties' stipulation to the
value of Cockle's coverage.199 However, determining and valuing each
benefit made available by the employer places an administrative and
controversy-laden burden on the Department and self-insured em-
195. It is beyond the scope of this Note and of the Cockle opinion to address a looming
"what if." Under certain circumstances, workers drawing workers' compensation will have
health benefits provided through some other mechanism: spousal support, social security, Medi-
caid, or some yet-unimagined state program. Under the Cockle opinion, would workers also re-
ceive an allowance for the value of their employer-provided health insurance? If Cockle is under-
stood to establish the rule that health care is a "core" worker benefit, then perhaps not, since
health care will be available. If, instead, Cockle is understood to establish the rule that the value
of employer-provided health insurance is a "core" worker benefit, then, perhaps yes. Either way,
the jurisprudence will have to accommodate substantive law from other realms, perhaps even
raising Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) implications. It is also beyond
this Note's scope to contemplate whether the difference in value between, say, a Medicaid health
plan and the previously enjoyed employer-provided health plan would be compensable.
196. "[Ain employer makes a contribution towards the purchase of health benefits for an
employee or that employee's dependent, either directly or through a 'cafeteria' arrangement, or
establishes a self-insurance scheme that directly pays the employee's medical bills." WING ET
AL., supra note 28, at 98.
197. One commentator on workers' compensation has stated:
[S]ubjective elements of the workers' compensation system encourage excessive use of
medical services. Unlike health or government program coverage, where the individ-
ual has no economic incentive to continue medical treatment beyond its remedial
value, an injured worker can use on-going medical care as evidence of the severity of
disability to justify benefit payments under the indemnity component of workers'
compensation.
Ballen, supra note 2, at 1293.
198. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 822, 16 P.3d at 594.
199. Id. at 805-806, 16 P.3d at 585.
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ployers. This burden will necessarily delay workers' compensation
payments and generate disputes over the valuation of benefits. °°
The Cockle majority's interpretation of the phrase "other consid-
eration of like nature" in RCW 51.08.178(1) unnecessarily compli-
cates the statute's complex wage-calculation formula and, in turn, the
payment of workers' compensation. First, the majority leaves room
for the inclusion of work benefits that are usually excludable from
wages. Second, what constitutes a "core benefit" to an injured worker
depends upon personal preferences. Finally, it is difficult to fashion a
fair and efficient method to determine and value "core, nonfringe"
benefits, particularly since workers often move between different em-
ployers who offer different types of insurance policies and benefits.
B. Cockle's Definition of "Wages" Will Impair the Recognized
Perception of "Economic Loss" and "Wage-Earning Capacity" as Used
in the Industrial Insurance Act
Intertwined with the notion of workers' compensation as wage
replacement is the concept of "lost earning capacity," which focuses
on whether an injured worker retains the ability to perform at a gainful
occupation." 1 If a worker is unable to perform at a gainful occupation,
"lost earning capacity" entitles him or her to wage-replacement bene-
fits for temporary loss of wage-earning capacity, 20 2 or to a pension for
permanent loss of wage-earning capacity.
20 3
The Cockle majority's finding that an injured worker should be
compensated based upon his or her actual "lost earning capacity"
should not include the value of employer-provided health insurance
because it would upset long-established notions of "economic loss"
and "wage-earning capacity." For example, if IIA's wage definition
were to include all in-kind consideration, the calculation of wages for
seasonal, part-time, or intermittent workers would be difficult. 24 As
200. "[I]t became obvious there was little consensus among L&I's stakeholders regarding
solutions to challenges posed by the Cockle decision and other complexities in the existing law."
DEP'T OF LABOR & INDUS., WASHINGTON STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFIT
STUDY at 2 (Oct. 2001) (on file with Seattle University Law Review) [hereinafter BENEFIT
STUDY].
201. Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash. 2d 793, 798, 947 P.2d 727, 729 (1997).
202. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090 (2000).
203. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.160 (2000) ("'Permanent total disability' means loss
of both legs, or arms, or one leg and one arm, total loss of eyesight, paralysis or other condition
permanently incapacitating the worker from performing any work at any gainful occupation.");
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.060(1) (2000) (providing that when "the supervisor of industrial in-
surance shall determine that permanent total disability results from the injury, the worker shall
receive monthly during the period of such disability" if other specified statutory requirements are
met).
204. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.178(2) (2000) (emphasis added) provides:
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Nancy Thygesen Day argued in her amicus curiae brief for Washing-
ton Self-Insurers Association:
The Department or the self-insured employer would be required
to look back at each and every employer the worker had during a
representative 12-month period, determine every monetary or
in-kind payment to the worker, determine the monetary value of
every in-kind payment to the worker and then average the"wages" to determine the workers' wages for time-loss compen-
205sation purposes.
The Department, moreover, will face a number of complexities
and inconsistencies when calculating the wages of workers employed
in other categories of employment." 6 If the Department and self-
insured employers must spend additional time and resources to adju-
dicate claims, the payment of benefits will be delayed. Significant dis-
ruptions in IIA's workers' compensation scheme will not only hinder
swift and certain relief for injured workers but also frustrate the
"closely calculated system of wage-loss benefits.
27
In addition, the Legislature stated, "One of the primary purposes
of [IIA] is to enable the injured worker to become employable at gain-
ful employment." 208 What is "gainful" depends upon the wage-
earning capacity the worker retains after a work-related injury. Under
the majority's theory of "wages," the inquiry into whether an injured
In cases where (a) the worker's employment is exclusively seasonal in nature or (b) the
worker's current employment or his or her relation to his or her employment is essen-
tially part-time or intermittent, the monthly wages shall be determined by dividing by
twelve the total wages earned, including overtime, from all employment in any twelve
successive calendar months preceding the injury which fairly represent the claimant's
employment pattern.
The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted this statute in several cases. See, e.g., Dep't of
Labor & Indus. v. Avundes, 140 Wash. 2d 282, 284, 996 P.2d 593, 594 (2000) ("essentially part-
time or intermittent" workers); Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash. 2d 793, 796, 947
P.2d 727, 728 (1997) ("exclusively seasonal" workers). In a recent study, the Department ac-
knowledged that a difficulty in calculating benefits includes determining employment patterns -
intermittent, part-time, and seasonal. BENEFIT STUDY, supra note 200.
205. Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington Self-Insurers Ass'n at 6, Cockle v.
Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash. 2d 801, 16 P.3d 583 (2000) (No. 68539-8).
206. Examples of complexities and inconsistencies in the current law include: (1) two sepa-
rate formulas used to determine the wages of part-time employment without guidance on how to
apply them; (2) no formula to fairly and consistently calculate the wages of workers on variable
shifts or non-standard workweeks, or for workers whose pay is based upon production; (3) and
no provisions to calculate the wages of self-employed workers. BENEFIT STUDY, supra note 200,
at 5.
207. Brand v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. 2d 659, 671, 989 P.2d 1111, 1117
(1999) (quoting 8 LARSON § 83.11 (1999)).
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.095(1) (2000). "'[G]ainful occupation' requires more
than the worker exercis[ing] some control and management of a business of which he is the pro-
prietor." Layrite Prod. Co. v. Degenstein, 74 Wash. App. 881, 888, 880 P.2d 535, 538 (1994).
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worker is capable of performing at a gainful occupation must consider
any employment providing value to the worker that is monetarily
equivalent to gainful wages. This theory suggests that any employ-
ment compensating an injured worker with sufficient in-kind services
will equate to the monetary earnings of a worker in a gainful occupa-
tion. Therefore, if an injured worker is capable of obtaining and per-
forming a job that provides only "in-kind components.., that are
critical to protecting workers' basic health and survival,, 219 with real
economic value equaling gainful monetary wages, the worker will not
be considered totally disabled because he or she retains wage-earning
capacity.22 °
Finally, under the Cockle majority's theory, the value of in-kind
benefits received by the injured worker might produce more wages
during post-injury employment. This may occur when, as a result of
an industrial injury, a worker moves from a higher paying, no-benefit
job to a lesser-paying, multi-benefit job. Such an occurrence will re-
duce or eliminate "lost earning capacity" benefits.2  Under the
majority's theory, the payment in-kind would not be excluded from
wages, but would be included based upon a "reasonably calculable"
monetary value. The injured worker would, in turn, be commanding
more in wages with a reduced physical capacity and a lesser hourly
monetary payment than he or she was earning prior to the industrial
injury, hence, not entitled to loss of earning power benefits under
RCW 51.32.090(3).
C. Cockle Adopts a Definition of "Wages" Producing Strained Results in
Other Contexts Throughout The Industrial Insurance Act
The Cockle majority's finding that other statutory provisions do
not show legislative intent to exclude employer-provided benefits from
the definition of "wages" fails to recognize that the definition will ap-
209. Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash. 2d 801, 822, 16 P.3d 583, 594 (2001).
210. The notions of "gainful employment" and "economic loss" are inextricably tied.
When an injured worker cannot maintain gainful employment, that worker suffers economic
loss. In contrast, an injured worker who retains any portion of his or her wages or who continues
to receive employer-provided benefits does not suffer economic loss. See id. at 815 n.6, 16 P.3d
at 589 n.6 ("Logically, any portion of 'wages' that injured workers continue to enjoy during their
disability period is not part of their 'economic loss'."); South Bend Sch. Dist. No. 18 v. White,
106 Wash. App. 309, 314, 23 P.3d 546, 549 (2001) ("A worker does not suffer economic loss
while he or she is continuing to receive personal sick leave benefits equal to the amount he or she
would have earned if not injured.").
211. See Pluto v. Illinois Indus. Comm'n, 650 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (stating
that inclusion of fringe benefits in the calculation of wages could work to the claimant's disad-
vantage where actual earnings of the post-accident employment are less than the original em-
ployment but the benefits are significantly greater).
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ply in other contexts throughout IIA. 2 Therefore, the majority's
suggestion that inclusion of employer-provided health insurance will
not have a far-reaching effect on other IIA provisions is unpersuasive.
For example, RCW 51.32.090(6) renders an injured worker ineligible
for time-loss compensation if the employer "continue[s] to pay him or
her the wages which he or she was earning at the time of [the] in-
jury. Presumably, under the majority's theory, if the employer
chooses to compensate an injured worker post-injury with only in-
kind services equaling his or her monetary wages, the worker would be
ineligible for time-loss compensation.
Another example involves RCW 51.32.110(4). Under the stat-
ute, if the Department or self-insurer directs an injured worker to at-
tend a medical examination requiring the worker "to be absent from
his or her work without pay," the worker is to be paid an amount
"equal to his or her usual wages for the time lost from work while at-
tending the medical examination. ' 214 The majority's computation of
wages for these hours or partial days would necessarily include the
complex economic valuations for each benefit given or made available
to the worker, even though the worker likely loses none of those bene-
fits by taking a few hours away from work to attend the examination.
In addition, RCW 51.32.160(2) allows the Department to sus-
pend or terminate pension benefits if a totally disabled worker "re-
turns to gainful employment for wages. "215 Under the majority's in-
terpretation, pensioned injured workers can have their benefits
terminated if they engage in any activity in exchange for in-kind ser-
vices with economic value equaling gainful monetary compensation.
Therefore, it is likely that employees working for in-kind services
would be more vulnerable to fraud penalties.2 16 RCW 51.32.095(1)
212. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.178 (2000) (defining the term "wages" "[flor the pur-
poses of this title").
213. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090(6) (2000). The majority seems to suggest that an
employer will receive an offset if it continues health benefits, as required by statute, during the
worker's disability. See Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 815 n.6, 16 P.3d at 589 n.6 ("We, too, read
RCW 51.32.090(6) to mean that, to the extent employer-provided 'wages'. . . are continued dur-
ing temporary total disability, time-loss compensation is reduced accordingly.").
214. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.110(4)(a)(i) (2000).
215. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.160(2) (2000).
216. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.240 (2000); Layrite Prod. Co. v. Degenstein, 74
Wash. App. 881, 888, 880 P.2d 535, 538 (1994) (holding that the jury had sufficient evidence to
find that the injured worker fraudulently misrepresented his working status in his monthly in-
dustrial insurance applications when the worker regularly engaged in tasks such as dispatching,
driving, and repairing cabs without receiving compensation from his employer taxi company).
The Department must annually compile a comprehensive report on workers' compensation fraud
in Washington. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.22.331 (2000). During fiscal year 2000, the Depart-
ment spent $3.9 million to detect fraud among workers, employers, and providers. DEP'T OF
LABOR & INDUS. WORKERS' COMPENSATION FRAUD REPORT, at 1 (May 1, 2001) (discussing
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also involves "gainful employment" language, providing for vocational
rehabilitation services when such services are "both necessary and
likely to enable the injured worker to become employable at gainful
employment. ' 217 What constitutes "gainful employment" will change
under the majority's interpretation, therefore likely impacting the
availability of vocational rehabilitation services to injured workers.
Finally, there is evidence that the Legislature did not intend
IIA's definition of "wages" to include employer-provided benefits.
For example, RCW 51.32.055(7)(a)(v) and .055(9)(a)(iv) contain pro-
visions referring to "wages and benefits. '218  If the Legislature in-
tended wages to include benefits, it would not have had to delineate
between the two within these sections. The majority, however, failed
to address this evidence of legislative intent in its opinion in Cockle.
D. Cockle May Constitute a Change of Circumstances Requiring Claims'
Readjustment
Because Cockle expanded the definition of "wages" to include
health insurance, Cockle may constitute a "change of circumstances"
within the meaning of RCW 51.28.040,219 justifying a recalculation of
compensation. Therefore, Cockle may affect how far back an adjuster
must go in recalculating and repaying time-loss compensation.
In Washington, two methods exist for providing industrial in-
surance to workers. First, an employer may insure with the State
Fund with the Department administering those claims.22' Alterna-
tively, employers who meet certain criteria may self-insure. 221 Self-
insurers may either administer their own claims or contract with third
parties to do so. 222 The Department, however, remains responsible for
issuing most final orders authorizing or closing an injured worker's
claim.223
recommendations to improve the Department's ability to address fraud) (on file with Seattle
University Law Review).
217. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.095(1) (2000).
218. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.055(7)(a)(v), (9)(a)(iv) (2000).
219. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.28.040 provides:
If change of circumstances warrants an increase or rearrangement of compensation,
like application shall be made therefor. Where the application has been granted,
compensation and other benefits if in order shall be allowed for periods of time up to
sixty days prior to the receipt of such application.
220. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.175 (2000).
221. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.08.173, 51.14 (2000).
222. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.14.110.
223. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.04.082, 51.52.060(4)(a) (2000). "In Washington, the
department takes a very active role in monitoring the management of claims involving self-
insured employers. For example, a self-insured employer cannot reopen a case without approval
of the department." AUDIT REPORT, supra note 24, at 85.
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The Cockle decision raises issues concerning the effective date for
readjustment of past benefits and when future benefits should be paid
or readjusted. Cockle arguably applies to all periods of time loss for
any open claims where there is no final and binding order setting forth
the basis for the worker's wages and time-loss rate. All time loss pre-
viously paid on open, compensable claims is therefore subject to up-
ward revision, even if the claim has been open for many years. For
these reasons, self-insured employers may be disadvantaged as com-
pared to state-fund employers because of Cockle.
For example, in most, if not all, state-fund claims, the Depart-
ment sets the time-loss rate by appealable order.224 Once the Depart-
ment's order is final as to state-fund claims, the time-loss rate cannot
be revisited and the rate governs for the life of the claim. In virtually
all self-insured claims, however, the employer pays time-loss compen-
sation and the employer or its administrator calculates and pays the
time loss without the Department issuing an appealable order setting
the rate. In light of Cockle, where there is no final and binding order
setting the time-loss rate as to self-insured claims, workers may assert
that all previously paid compensation must be retroactively adjusted
so as to go back to the inception of the claim.
If Cockle constitutes a change of circumstances, RCW 51.28.040
may limit retroactive exposure to sixty days prior to the worker's re-
quest for the adjustment. On the other hand, Cockle may not be con-
sidered a change of circumstances because the statute traditionally
contemplates factual, not legal changes.22
E. The Legislature is in a Better Position Than the Court to Alter the
Definition of "Wages"
When a party proposes to alter a statutory scheme, the legislative
body traditionally addresses the issue. The Cockle decision, however,
demonstrates a failure to adhere to the respective functions of the three
branches of government. First, the legislative process is designed to
address the practical implications that will likely result from a statu-
tory adjustment. The dissent in Cockle recognized: "The Legislature
can hear from all parties with a stake in this controversy; it can balance
the interest of employers in a stable premium obligation against the
224. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.080 (2000).
225. See Foster v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 161 Wash. 54, 60, 296 P. 148, 150 (1931)
(holding that RCW 51.28.040 did not apply to change of circumstances through marriage and
birth or children to worker who was single at the time of his industrial injury.) "Changes in the
law or changes in the interpretation of a law do not constitute a change of circumstances."
INSURANCE SERVICES POLICY MANUAL CLAIMS ADMINISTRATION, INTERIM POLICY 4.40 at
5 (Feb. 15, 2001) (on file with Seattle University Law Review).
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needs of workers who should be compensated for their injuries. "226
Such a circumstance might arise, for example, when labor proposes
workers' compensation legislation restricting group self-insurance (al-
lowing small and medium-sized businesses to form associations to
provide their own coverage), three-way industrial insurance (allowing
private insurers to write industrial insurance coverage), and the retro-
spective rating program (providing workers' compensation premium
refunds to employers in the State Fund that have good safety re-
cords). 227  These proposals require legislative action and allow for
broader public participation. The judicial policymaking in Cockle,
however, was more closely intertwined with the resolution of an indi-
vidual worker's compensation claim rather than the administration of
Washington's complex workers' compensation system.
The Cockle decision continues the growing trend to remove dis-
putes from the legislative process into courtrooms. Prior to Cockle, for
example, the Washington Supreme Court held that an injured farm
worker was neither a part-time nor intermittent worker at the time of
his injury after he worked nineteen different jobs, lasting between one
day and six weeks, for fourteen months prior to his injury.228 There-
fore, the court found that the worker's monthly wages should be cal-
culated under RCW 51.08.178(1) for time-loss benefits as though he
was continuously employed. 229  After Cockle, the court held that a
worker's common law claim for wrongful discharge was not precluded
by Washington's Law Against Discrimination,230 which exempts em-
ployers with fewer than eight employees from statutorily created
remedies for employment discrimination. 21 The court also held that a
worker who is classified permanently totally disabled and placed on
pension may thereafter receive a permanent partial disability award for
an unrelated occupational disease that developed prior to the pension
award.232 Decisions like these will continue to erode the already tenu-
ous relationship between business and labor, prompting battles over
the scope of workers' compensation in the Legislature.
The dissent in Cockle supports this view. Justice Talmadge, the
only justice on the Cockle court to serve in the Legislature, argued in
226. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 834, 16 P.3d at 599 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
227. See WASHINGTON STATE LABOR COUNCIL'S LEGISLATIVE POSITION PAPERS
(2001) (on file with Seattle University Law Review).
228. Dep't of Labor and Indus. v. Avundes, 140 Wash. 2d 282, 284-85, 996 P.2d 593,
594-95 (2000).
229. Id. at 290, 996 P.2d at 597.
230. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 (2000).
231. Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash. 2d 58, 69, 993 P.2d 901, 907 (2000).
232. Mclndoe v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 144 Wash. 2d 252, 266, 26 P.3d 903, 910
(2001).
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dissent that courts are "divorced from the reality of modern workplace
compensation and the give and take of labor-management negotia-
tions. By contrast, Robert Stern of Washington State Labor Coun-
cil insists that if the position advanced in this Note prevailed in the
Legislature, "injured workers would continue to suffer [the] injustice
that [had] been done to them until the majority of the supreme court
rectified the situation in Cockle. '234  Although lawmakers are not
above judges, the Legislature is nonetheless in the best position to de-
termine the efficacy of expanding the definition of "wages" under a
specialized statutory enactment such as IIA.
The Legislature acknowledged the complexity of calculating
workers' compensation under Cockle. "This decision significantly in-
creases the complexity of calculating benefits and therefore the admin-
istrative and legal costs of the workers' compensation program." '235 As
a consequence, in the 2001-2003 Operating Budget, the Legislature
appropriated $2.9 million to the Department to administer the change
mandated by the Cockle ruling. 236 The Legislature also directed the
Department to develop statutory language that provides greater cer-
tainty and simplicity in the calculation of benefits.237 Finally, the Leg-
islature provided for six additional judges and six support staff to help
the Board with its increase in appeals workload and 6.5 full-time em-
ployees to help the Board handle the litigation generated by Cockle.23s
F. The Legislature Should Narrow the Definition of "Wages" in Response
to Cockle
In virtually every jurisdiction where the definition of "wages"
was expanded by judicial decision, the legislature subsequently nar-
233. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 831, 16 P.3d at 598 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
234. E-mail from Robert Stern, to Matthew Adams (Nov. 28, 2001, 12:40 PST) (on file
with Seattle University Law Review).
235. Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill (ESSB) 6153, Laws of 2001, ch.7, § 217(2). Impor-
tantly, the complexity of calculating of benefits must be considered in light of expensive system
costs and potential for fraud. See LABOR & INDUS. WORKERS' COMPENSATION FRAUD
REPORT (May 1, 2000) (discussing the detection of fraud within the $1 billion annual workers'
compensation system).
236. ESSB 6153, supra note 235.
237. Id. The Department has recently proposed legislation to implement the Cockle deci-
sion. This proposal would (1) raise time-loss compensation and permanent total disability com-
pensation benefits to 67% of gross wages; (2) set the value of health benefits, including dental and
vision care, at a flat rate of $307; (3) set the minimum time-loss payment at $352 per month; (4)
leave unchanged death benefits except to increase the minimum to $352 per month; and (5) allow
a worker granted a reopening on a claim to be paid benefits for a period up to sixty days prior to
the date of the application. BENEFIT STUDY, supra note 200, at 4 (Oct. 2001). Both the draft
legislation and the study are filed with Seattle University Law Review.
238. ESSB 6153, supra note 235, § 215.
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rowed the scope of such a judicial interpretation.239 This phenomenon
illustrates the give-and-take of the legislative process. If the Legisla-
ture chooses to narrow the scope of the Cockle majority's interpreta-
tion of RCW 51.08.178, the Legislature should adopt a wage defini-
tion that is consistent with the traditional notion that wages do not
include fringe benefits.
Although the Cockle majority rejected the Department's inter-
pretation of wages, the dissent preferred deferring to the Department
since the Department is entrusted with carrying out IIA's provi-
sions.240 Prior to Cockle, neither the Department nor the stakeholders
understood wages to include employer-provided fringe benefits, such
as health insurance, in the definition of "wages." Accordingly, the
Cockle majority's interpretation of RCW 51.08.178 constituted an un-
expected windfall for workers and an unanticipated expense for the
Department and self-insured employers that was never factored into
industrial insurance premiums or cost projections.
2 41
The Legislature intended IIA to provide a method of disposing
of workers' compensation claims with as little technical formality as
possible. 242 With this intent in mind, the Legislature should eliminate
the ambiguous language to narrow the definition of "wages" under
RCW 51.08.178. For example, the Legislature should remove the
phrases "reasonable value" and "other consideration of like nature."
Instead, the term "wages" should mean monetary payment plus the
actual value of board, housing and fuel received from the employer as
239. See Ragland v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 724 P.2d 519, 521 (Alaska 1986) (holding that
health and welfare benefits could be viewed as "money rate" of compensation and noting that the
Alaska legislature revised the statute to exclude medical benefits from wages during litigation of
this case in former ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(15) (1983)); Ciampi v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 681
A.2d 4, 9 (Me. 1996) (noting Maine legislature acted to amend statute to restrict the fringe bene-
fits included in wages after the court held that health and welfare benefits constituted "wages,
earnings, or salary"); Murphy v. Ampex Corp., 703 P.2d 632, 633-35 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding health and welfare benefits are analogous to board and rent and that the legislature acted
to limit fringe benefit coverage to those expressly enumerated in COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-40-
201(19)(b) (2000)).
240. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 829, 16 P.3d at 597 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
241. Washington has been recognized as a state with relatively high benefits and low pre-
mium costs. It is in the top 25% in benefits offered and the bottom 25% in costs charged. These
attributes are largely the result of the structure of the state's system and the way in which the
State manages claims. See geneTally AUDIT REPORT, snp a note 24. In contrast, David Kaplan,
executive director of Washington Self-Insurers Association, argues that the true costs of claims
are hidden because under RCW 51.44.100, the State Investment Board has invested surpluses in
the accident and medical aid funds, and those investments have realized positive returns in light
of the strong economy. If premiums are declining and refunds are being made for state-fund
workers, self-insured employers are not benefited because they are not receiving a reduction in
premiums.
242. Hoff v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 198 Wash. 257, 260, 88 P.2d 419, 420 (1939).
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part of the hiring contract.243 In addition, the Legislature should enact
a definition that precisely indicates which, if any, work benefits are in-
cluded in wages, rather than stating "wages does not include fringe
benefits, including but not limited to .... " This latter language cre-
ates the potential for disputes over which unlisted fringe benefits are
part of wages. On the other hand, restricting qualifying benefits to a
closed list of enumerated items shows clear legislative intent to exclude
all other benefits. 2" This proposal would help to insure faster claims
resolution and certainty of costs.
245
Alternatively, the Legislature could expressly include in wages
employer-provided medical, dental, and vision care, but exclude other
fringe benefits. Under this approach, the Legislature should deter-
mine includable benefits by considering whether the benefit is criti-
cal-like board, housing, and fuel-for workers' basic health and sur-
vival. Even if the Legislature chooses to include employer-provided
health insurance in IIA's wage definition, the value of the insurance
must be set at a statutory amount, because setting the value at a hypo-
thetical market rate creates unnecessary confusion. In the final analy-
sis, these suggestions would lead to a more precise wage definition that
is readily applicable throughout IIA and, most importantly, carry out
its stated purpose.
The Legislature enacted IIA to provide swift and certain relief
for injured workers, charging the Department to administer payment
of time-loss compensation benefits. In exercising its constitutional
role, the Cockle majority determined that deference to the Depart-
ment's interpretation of wages was "inappropriate" because the inter-
243. This suggestion squares with the notion that "an injured worker should be compen-
sated based not on an arbitrarily set figure, but rather on his or her actual 'lost earning capacity."'
Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 811, 16 P.3d at 588 (emphasis added) (quoting Double D Hop Ranch v.
Sanchez, 133 Wash. 2d 793, 798, 947 P.2d 727, 729 (1997)).
244. In Cockle, the majority stated that the Legislature decided against enumerating all
qualifying benefits. See id. at 809, 16 P.3d at 587. The majority found as unpersuasive the ar-
gument that 'by not including health insurance in its definition of wages in RCW 51.08.178,
the Legislature intentionally excluded it."' Id. at 810 n.4, 16 P.3d at 587 n.4 (quoting Concur-
rence in Dissent (Guy, C.J.)).
245. See ASS'N OF WASHINGTON BUSINESS, STATE LABOR LAW COMPETITIVENESS
ISSUES (Jan. 2002) (on file with Seattle University Law Review) (stating that the Cockle decision
has "thrown out 30 years of workers' compensation law and made it impossible to close any
claims with certainty as to final cost .... [U]nless there is a legislative fix, it means that most
time loss claims will not be finalized until future litigation over the next three to six years deter-
mines which additional benefits must be included in the calculation. Employers will have no
idea what their costs will be until the litigation is complete."); BENEFIT STUDY, supra note 200,
at 2 (acknowledging that the "comments and suggestions made by business and labor representa-
tives... made it clear that a broad approach would not produce a workable solution").
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pretation conflicted with IIA's liberal construction mandate. 246  The
majority pointed out the conflict, but failed to provide a more precise
definition of "wages." In essence, the majority judicially expanded
IIA to keep pace with recent trends.247 If the Cockle majority's inter-
pretation of wages is followed by legislative action, the Department's
administration of Washington's complex workers' compensation sys-
tem will improve and the judicial branch will have better guidance to
determine the purpose, scope, and meaning of IIA's provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
By including employer-provided health insurance in IIA's wage
definition for calculating workers' compensation, the Cockle majority
failed to recognize the careful balancing that occurred in determining
what should constitute loss of wage-earning capacity, gainful em-
ployment, and loss of earning power. Although IIA is remedial and
must be liberally construed in favor of the worker, an interpretation of
the term "wages" that inserts complex economic variables into a sys-
tem purposefully designed to provide swift and certain relief with lim-
ited employer liability will disrupt the overall workers' compensation
system. Furthermore, IIA's purpose may be frustrated over time
when employers pass costs to their workers due to the proliferation of
litigation, increases in insurance premiums, and limitations on com-
pensation benefits.
IIA represents a careful balance between business and labor in-
terests. If the Legislature intended wages to include health insurance
and all other "core" in-kind benefits to which an economic value can
be assigned, such directive would appear in IIA. This tipping of the
scales is not up to a single injured worker or single court. Although
injured workers are "flesh and blood people" who have lost a great
deal as a result of workplace injuries, any rework or redesign of the
workers' compensation system belongs, if anywhere, in the Legisla-
ture. Legislative members are poised to address the plight of their
constituents, including injured workers.
246. Cockle, 142 Wash. 2d at 812, 16 P.3d at 588 (quoting Dep't of Labor & Indus. v.
Landon, 117 Wash. 2d 122, 127, 814 P.2d 626, 628 (1991)).
247. See id. at 823, 16 P.3d at 594 ("]ust as 'board, housing [and] fuel' were core, non-
fringe benefits critical to protecting the basic health and survival of workers injured in the early
1900s, whose suffering such legislative language was originally designed to reduce, so also were
the health care premiums paid by Cockle's employer in exchange for her labor in the late 1900s a
nonfringe component of her lost 'wages."'). But see Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir. Of-
fice of Workers' Comp. Programs, 461 U.S. 624 (1983) (holding that a comprehensive statute
such as LHWCA should not to be judicially expanded because of modern trends); Potomac Elec.
Power Co. *v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 449 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1980)
(same).
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